Regulation To Protect Investors
From High Profits
There
is actually very little regulation which applies
directly to investors other than tax law; regulation
to protect investors is instead applied to those
who advise investors, those who sell investment
products, and those who are involved in the investment
process itself. These three roles are often combined,
but quite often they are differentiated, with
three sets of rules covering three different professional
bodies or financial sectors.
Of
course it is a legitimate role of government to
provide a regime in which ordinary citizens can
place their savings in secure investments without
being robbed at every turn, but most high-tax
countries have gone wildly over the top by constructing
extremely complex bodies of legislation which
seek to control every step of the investment process.
Historically, most savings (investment) activity
took place exclusively in domestic market places,
other than for very wealthy people, and the general
opening-up of international financial markets
that has taken place in the last thirty years
created many challenges for national regulators.
They have responded magnificently, adding further
layers of legislative armour-plating to existing
structures.
The European Savings Tax Directive (introduced in 2005),
could be viewed as an example of this, as well as a revenue protection
exercise.
The
general effect of this protective legislation
is to prevent investment providers from offering
or actively selling products to investors unless
they (the providers and the products) conform
with regulatory guidelines and prescriptive rules.
The result is to reduce choice for the investor,
and to limit the returns that can be offered -
because a highly remunerative investment will
almost certainly fall foul of the rules. Thus,
a hedge fund in Hong Kong operating in highly-geared
equity derivatives cannot be offered to investors
in most OECD countries.
Protective
legislation varies in its ferocity, but usually
imposes criminal sanctions on the operators of
businesses which break the rules. The US is particularly
aggressive in this respect, and unapproved investment
providers go to great lengths to avoid any appearance
of selling to US residents. In most OECD countries,
the rules mean no newspaper or television advertising,
no direct mail, no personal or telephone solicitation,
and no agencies.
But,
and it's a big but, there is usually nothing to
prevent an investor from unilaterally contacting
an investment provider anywhere in the world,
and doing business. Most investment providers
(banks, investment funds, insurers, brokerages)
are happy enough to deal with whomsoever walks
through the door, although US citizens may sometimes
be turned away if the provider feels particularly
exposed to US sanctions.
The
Internet has blasted a big hole in the regulators'
defences, by creating an information channel which
bypasses national restrictions. An Internet advertiser
may genuinely not intend to communicate with a
US citizen, and may say 'These investments are
not available to US citizens', but cannot prevent
an American from looking at the ad, or from acting
on it. How is a mutual fund in the British Virgin
Islands to know that an American walking in off
the street while on vacation saw their ad on the
Internet? Should they refuse his business? The
situation is the same for many other OECD countries,
although not for all.
As
will be seen in the next section, the tax rules
applying to US citizens in particular are a second,
and very effective, line of defence for the regulators.
In general, though, the development of the Internet
may eventually result in a situation where all
investors have perfect knowledge about what is
available, about returns, about risks, even, and
about mechanisms for investing. National defences
against non-conforming investments, in that situation,
would crumble. This would be good for the investor,
of course, but could cause regulators to turn
increasingly to tax-based defences.
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